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An Assessment of the Implications of
EU Enlargement for Foreign Direct
Investment and Jobs in Ireland
By Alan P Murphy*
ABSTRACT
This study examines the potential implications of EU enlargement for
employment and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ireland. Despite fears
associated with this substantial pool of low-wage workers now inside the
EU, our analysis of patterns of FDI suggests that Ireland faces a somewhat
limited threat from FDI diverting into the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
region, at least over the next few years. The sectoral composition of Irish
FDI is very different to that of the FDI going to the CEE region. Much of
the foreign direct investment going into Eastern Europe in the 1990s was
through mergers or takeovers of existing enterprises, while in Ireland FDI
projects are of the ‘‘greenfield’’ variety.
Currently Ireland has a somewhat narrow sectoral concentration of FDI in
a handful of ‘‘high-tech’’ sectors and relies heavily on investment flows from
US multinationals. Ireland could be vulnerable to worldwide shocks to our
chosen sectors or to a general downturn in the US economy. A further
potentially serious source of concern in relation to Ireland’s current FDI
strategy is our ability to maintain relative cost competitiveness. This is
highlighted by our finding that wage cost considerations are an important
factor leading multinational firms to re-allocate jobs among the higher-wage
countries in Europe.
1. Introduction
In a small open economy such as Ireland’s the maintenance of
cost competitiveness is of key importance for sustaining a
successful pattern of economic growth. The unprecedented
expansion of the Irish economy in recent years has raised wage
levels substantially relative to our European neighbours. While
these developments have had the positive effect of boosting
living standards for Irish workers, the consequent erosion of
relative cost competitiveness is now an important concern for
policy makers.
The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 has further highlighted
these concerns relating to Ireland’s cost competitiveness. The
demise of the Communist legacy and the opening up of the
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Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies at the start of the
1990s represented an abrupt shock. Virtually overnight, Western
Europe was confronted with a group of neighbouring countries
with a very different set of economic conditions. Given that these
countries are now fully integrated members of the European
Union, there are a number of concerns relating to potential
negative effects that the enlargement process might have on
countries such as Ireland. Many of these concerns relate to
employment, because the CEE region represents a large reservoir
of low wage labour in Western Europe’s backyard.
One of the most obvious ways in which employment in Ireland
might be affected by this accelerating economic integration is
through the employment re-allocation decisions of Multinational
Enterprises (MNEs). It is often argued that MNEs are footloose
(e.g. Caves, 1996). By operating a portfolio of affiliates in diverse
national markets they can re-allocate their factors of production
across these markets to minimise their production costs. In this
paper, we focus on this issue, and describe the results of a Bank
study that has analysed how multinationals reshuffle jobs
between the parent and their affiliates.
The contents of the paper are as follows. Section 2 provides
some background facts and figures relating to trends of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in Europe. Section 3 discusses some of
the strategies followed by firms undertaking FDI. Section 4
describes the data used for our analysis of job re-allocation across
parents and affiliates of MNEs and section 5 reports some of the
results from this work. Section 6 discusses how EU enlargement
may affect prospects for future FDI into Ireland. Section 7
concludes.
2. FDI Flows in Europe
Previous studies on foreign direct investment have shown that
the process of economic integration in Europe has had a
significant positive impact on FDI flows. In particular, the Single
European Act and the ongoing eastern enlargement of the EU
have commonly been cited as important factors influencing the
source and destination of FDI. Prior to the mid-1980s, European
FDI was largely dominated by investments made by US
companies. These flows were concentrated in the relatively high-
cost economies of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands
and UK, which together gained about 90 per cent of total
inward FDI.
The EU Internal Market Programme generated more intra-EU FDI
flows and had a negative impact on outward FDI from the EU
during the 1990s. It is estimated that the stock of world FDI
located in the EU grew from 31 per cent in 1985 to 41 perQuarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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cent in 1998.
1 At the same time, the relative importance of US
investment diminished, with a decline in total share from 28 per
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Figure 1: EU FDI Inflows 1987-2002
Source: UNCTAD.
Figure 1 shows the substantial growth in FDI inflows into the EU-
15 region over the period 1987 to 2002. FDI inflows over the
period 2000-2002 were about ten times as large as in 1987.
Interestingly, this growth has largely been an intra-EU
phenomenon: 72 per cent of FDI in the EU during the nineties





















































Figure 2: EU-25 FDI Flows 2002
Source: Eurostat.
1 Source: UNCTAD (2003).
2 Source: UNCTAD (2003).
3 Source: Eurostat (2004).Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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Figure 2 gives a snapshot (as of 2002) of FDI flows into and
out of countries in the enlarged EU, reporting these inflows and
outflows as shares of GDP.
4 A striking conclusion from the figure
is that Ireland has performed remarkably well in attracting FDI
inflows. Indeed, as of 2002, Ireland’s inflows as a share of GDP
exceeded any of the other EU-15 country inflows by a factor of
3. On the other hand, Irish FDI outflows are only 12 per cent
of inflows, perhaps reflecting the stage of development of our
indigenous industry.
The figure also shows the key role that FDI inflows into Central
and Eastern Europe are playing in promoting economic
development of that region. These countries on average are
experiencing far higher levels of FDI (as shares of GDP) than the
EU-15. For instance, both the Slovak Republic and Czech
Republic are in double-digit figures for FDI in terms of GDP for
2002. These are broadly in line with the levels experienced in
Ireland during the boom period of the 1990s, and indeed many
in Eastern Europe look to the Irish experience in this area as a
guide. It should be stressed, however, that while these FDI flows
are clearly playing an important role in developing Eastern
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Figure 3: CEE and Irish FDI Inflows 1992-2002










Consider Figure 3, which shows the level of CEE and Irish FDI
inflows over the period 1992-2002. Inflows into the CEE area
have seen a six-fold increase since 1992. However, using
absolute values it is clear that these economies still receive a
relatively small volume of FDI in a European context. Ireland has
only one per cent of the EU-15’s population and yet, since 1999,
4 The FDI reported in figure 2 are gross figures, so for example the Irish data includes IFSC
activities and retained earnings.Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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it gained a volume of FDI inflows comparable to the 10 CEE
accession countries with a population of circa 100 million. So,
while the level of FDI into Eastern Europe is large relative to their
GDPs, these GDPs are very low by Western European standards.
3. Two Views of the FDI Process
Research on FDI has generally stressed two different motivations
that may lie behind a firm’s decision to undertake investments to
locate production abroad. One of these views suggests that the
ongoing expansion of FDI into Eastern Europe may pose a threat
to jobs in Western Europe. The other suggests that FDI in CEE
economies may have little impact on employment in the rest of
the EU.
The first view of the FDI process is that it is driven by cost
minimisation. According to this view, cost considerations are the
most important element for investment decisions. Thus, while the
parent firm may undertake the more high-skill activities,
production that is low skilled and labour intensive is outsourced
to the low-wage and low-cost countries. In other words, MNEs
fragment the production process in stages, locating each stage
according to best cost advantage. According to this view, many
firms will be attracted to the CEE in preference to the EU-15,
because it is a low cost location (e.g. Braconier and Ekholm,
2001).
An alternative view sees FDI as driven largely by the desire for
market access. According to this theory, MNE investment arises
in preference to exporting, so that instead of producing all output
in one location and exporting it around the world, the MNE
chooses to locate affiliates in multiple markets. So, for example,
firms may wish to locate a production plant and sales office in
Poland to expand sales in that country, instead of trying to
directly export to Poland from elsewhere. This strategy is likely
to have advantages, if locating the production and sales
departments close to the market leads to improved knowledge
of local consumer preferences in this market. In this framework,
it is this type of strategic consideration that drives the investment
and resource allocation decisions of MNEs, with production
costs playing a relatively minor role (e.g. Lankes and Venables,
1996; Abraham and Konings, 1999).
In reality, of course, it is likely that both of these motivations are
important, with the relative importance of cost-minimisation and
market access differing for each specific investment project. For
instance, once a firm has decided that it wants to open an affiliate
in Western Europe to gain access to this market, cost
considerations may then heavily influence which specific
Western European country it chooses to produce in.Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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4. Data on European Multinational Enterprises
In the next two sections, we report some results from a Bank
study of job re-allocation across countries by MNEs.
This analysis uses a rich and unique database. It is the first of its
kind to comprehensively link information on EU parent MNEs
with information about their affiliates based in Europe. The data
contain complete information on the financial accounts and
ownership of medium and large firms. The information contained
in the data covers affiliates located in 24 countries in the
European region, with parent firms having their headquarters in
the pre-accession EU-15. This means that the majority of the
parent firms in the data set are European-owned corporations.
However, it is worth stressing that the data set does not
completely exclude US firms either. Many of the so-called
‘‘parent firms’’ in our data set are actually European headquarters
of US conglomerates. For example, General Motors’ European
headquarters appears as a parent firm in our data set.
The data set that we used in this study offers a number of
advantages relative to earlier work:
 It contains a substantial amount of information about
medium and large-sized MNEs with parents located in
various EU countries.
 It includes information on both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing parent firms and their affiliates. This allows
a distinction to be made between MNEs with affiliates
operating in the same sector or different sectors compared
to their parents. This helps to shed some light on the
strategies that MNEs are pursuing.
 We are able to differentiate on the basis of wage costs
across the European regions.
5 In particular, we can
distinguish between ‘‘very low’’ wage locations (CEE),
‘‘moderate’’ wage locations (South EU) [i.e. Spain, Italy,
Portugal and Ireland
6] and ‘‘high’’ wage locations (North
EU).
 This allows us to examine whether low wage competition
may potentially be important for ‘‘footloose’’
multinationals, enabling them to reshuffle expensive jobs
to cheaper ones in the ‘‘very low’’ wage locations within
greater Europe.
5. Employment Relocation Effects in Europe
The employment share of parent MNEs in our data set declined
from 85 per cent to 72 per cent between 1993 and 1998, while
5 Wages here refer to total labour costs including social security contribution and payroll tax.
6 The period of this study is 1993 to 1998. During this period Ireland was the highest wage
country in the ‘‘moderate’’ wage region.Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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the employment share of the affiliates steadily increased from 15
per cent to 28 per cent over this period. This suggests that a
relatively significant reshuffling of jobs between parent firms and
their affiliates took place over this relatively short time period. In
this section, we take a closer look at the data and examine the
relationship between parent and affiliate employment in a more
formal way.
5.1: Summary Statistics on Job Relocation
Looking at the data in more detail, the first pattern that emerges
is that the data are not consistent with a large ‘‘job drain’’ to
Eastern Europe. Affiliates located in the EU have increased their
employment shares, while the employment shares of the affiliates
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Figure 4: Evolution of Affiliate Employment in Total Employment


























Figure 4 makes the distinction between affiliates located in
‘‘South’’ Europe, ‘‘North’’ Europe and the CEE region. We can
see that the increased fraction of affiliate EU employment is
mainly driven by an increased fraction of employment in affiliates
located in the relatively high-wage North. A closer look at the
data tells us that most of the job relocation took place between
EU parent firms and their affiliates located in the North of Europe.
Table 1 shows some summary statistics on the mean
employment, wage and value added in our sample. Parent
companies in this sample employed on average 1,728 persons
for the 1993-2001 period. Affiliates employ fewer workers on
average. The typical EU affiliate employs 282 workers on
average, while the typical affiliate in CEE employs almost twice
as many workers (477).Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean 1993-2001
Parent Employment 1,728
In ‘CEE’ Affiliate 477
In ‘South’ EU Affiliate 263
In ‘North’ EU Affiliate 300
Parent Wage Cost per Worker $54,000
In ‘CEE’ Affiliate $9,000
In ‘South’ EU Affiliate $42,000
In ‘North’ EU Affiliate $49,000
Parent Value Added per Worker $109,000
In ‘CEE’ Affiliate $24,000
In ‘South’ EU Affiliate $87,000
In ‘North’ EU Affiliate $93,000
Number of affiliates 4
Source: Authors own calculations.
Note: Rounded to the nearest $1,000.
The more intensive use of labour in CEE affiliates is perhaps not
too surprising given that labour costs are much lower in the latter
region. The average labour cost per worker per year is $54,000
in parent firms and only $9,000 in the typical affiliate in the CEE
region. That said, it should also be noted that average labour
productivity is also much lower for CEE workers. In our sample,
value added per worker in the ‘‘North’’ EU is $93,000 and is
$87,000 in the ‘‘South’’ EU, but only $24,000 in the CEE region
on average. The low productivity of CEE workers explains why
these countries have not tended to get much FDI from high-
skill sectors.
5.2: Are MNEs Relocating Jobs to Low-Wage Countries?
The first method that we used to assess the relationship between
employment in parent firms and employment in affiliates was to
check the correlations between these two series. If there is a
positive correlation between employment in parent firms and
their affiliates, then these can be seen as complementary inputs.
On the other hand, if the relationship is negative this indicates
the employment in the parent and affiliate firms are potentially
substitutes for one another.
Table 3 reports the parent and affiliate employment correlations.
The figures in brackets under the correlations are the standard
errors of these estimates: only if the estimated correlation is
greater than twice the magnitude of the standard error can we
claim to have found statistically significant evidence of a
relationship between the two sets of employment figures. Two
patterns are worth noting from the table. First, there is evidence
of a negative correlation between parent and affiliate
employment for both EU and CEE affiliates. However, only the
correlation for the EU affiliates is statistically significant. Thus,
there is only weak evidence that parent firms are substituting
Western European jobs for jobs in Eastern European affiliates.Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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Second, when the sample is split between manufacturing and
non-manufacturing, it becomes clear that the employment
substitution effect is stronger in the manufacturing sector.
Column 2 shows that there is statistically significant evidence of
employment reshuffling between EU manufacturing affiliates and
their parents. Column 3 reports that there is no statistically
significant evidence for reshuffling of jobs in the non-
manufacturing sector.
7 This is most likely due to the nature of
this sector, in that it includes many non-tradable services.
Table 2: Parent MNE to Affiliate Employment Correlations
Whole Sample Manufacturing Non-manufacturing
(1) (2) (3)
EU Affiliate − 0.034** − 0.049** − 0.019
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
CEE Affiliate − 0.044 − 0.019 − 0.196
(0.103) (0.020) (0.263)
Notes: (1) Fixed effects regressions; log of Parent employment on Affiliate employment.
(2) *** indicates 1%, **5% and * 10% levels.
(3) Standard errors in brackets.
(4) All equations include year dummies.
(5) Wholesale and Retail excluded from non-manufacturing.
In further econometric analysis, the relationship between wage
costs and job reshuffling was directly tested. It was found that
job reshuffling between parents and their ‘‘North’’ EU affiliates is
significantly influenced by wage cost differences, but that wage
costs had a limited influence in causing job reshuffling to ‘‘South’’
EU or CEE affiliates. This effect is magnified if the affiliate is
operating in a different sector to the parent firm. The results
suggest that an increase in labour costs in a ‘‘North’’ EU affiliate
of 10 per cent is associated with a reduction in the affiliate’s
employment of about 1 per cent, which is quite substantial.
Overall, our results suggest that both the ‘‘cost minimisation’’
view and ‘‘market access’’ views appear to be operating. There
is little evidence of firms substituting jobs from high-wage
countries to the CEE region, so FDI in that region seems to be
driven mainly by market access considerations. However, within
the high-wage ‘‘North EU’’ region, cost considerations seem to
play an important role in determining the level of employment.
While these results suggest that Eastern Europe’s low cost base
is not a great threat to Irish employment as of now, they do
suggest that a loss of cost competitiveness in relation to other
western European countries could potentially have a large
negative impact. Using the estimated effect of ‘‘North’’ EU wages
on affiliate employment, a back-of-the-envelope calculation
implies that a 10 per cent loss in wage competitiveness relative
to other Western European countries could result in an initial loss
7 The wholesale and retail sector is excluded in this estimation.Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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of 1,300 jobs in Irish affiliates of MNEs.
8 This figure does not
include the jobs lost in other sectors whose profits and revenue
are supported by MNEs or persons involved in these activities. It
is estimated that for every job lost in an MNE affiliate, three jobs
are lost in other sectors.
6. Future Issues Facing Ireland and the EU
The results just presented suggest there is only limited evidence
that MNEs have been substituting jobs out of high-wage
countries and into the low-wage CEE region. However, this still
leaves open the question of whether Ireland is likely to lose out
to these countries in terms of future FDI, particularly now that
these countries have gained full entry into the EU. Our analysis
of patterns of FDI investment suggests that Ireland faces a
somewhat limited threat from FDI into the CEE region, at least












Low  Medium-Low Medium-High High
Ireland Slovak R. Romania Poland Hungary Czech R. Bulgaria
Figure 5: Sectoral Composition of FDI for Selected
European States in 2002










One reason for this is that the sectoral composition of the FDI
into the CEE region has been quite different to the Irish pattern.
In Ireland, the growth in manufacturing FDI during the 1990s was
driven mainly by the pharmaceutical, medical instrument and IT
sectors. Another difference between FDI into Ireland and the CEE
region is that a significant proportion of investment into Eastern
Europe was due to takeovers and mergers. This is consistent with
the ‘‘market access’’ view of FDI: Western European firms have
8 One qualification to this calculation is that it is based on the estimated effect of wage costs
on employment in the high-wage ‘‘North EU’’ group of countries. Over the period examined
in this study, Ireland was not part of this group of countries. However, given recent
developments in Irish wages, this is probably a reasonable estimate of the likely effects of
future losses in cost competitiveness.
9 Figure 5 is based on IDA employment data from Irish based multinationals and the Central
and Eastern European figures are derived from multinational firm level investment data.Quarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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looked to boost their sales in Eastern Europe by taking over
existing local plants and distribution chains. In contrast, Irish FDI
projects were far more likely to be ‘‘greenfield’’ operations
serving the EU rather than the local market.
Figure 5 shows how foreign direct investment into these sectors
has transformed the composition of Irish manufacturing FDI, with
the majority of jobs now in the high-tech sectors. In contrast, the
composition of FDI into the CEE region has tended to be
dominated by investments into low and medium-low technology
sectors. Foreign investment into Eastern Europe has largely
focused on oil and mineral extraction, assembly operations (for
example in the car, computer and white-good sectors), and
extensive chemical production.
Of course, policy-makers in the CEE region likely view Ireland’s
success in attracting high-tech FDI as a potential role model for
their future economic development. Hence, it is possible that in
the future, Ireland will face more competition from this region
for high value-added FDI projects, as the countries of this region
seek to make better use of their relatively well-educated
workforce.
That said, Ireland currently holds a substantial lead over the CEE
region in terms of its ability to attract FDI into high value-added
areas. Ireland’s current success is the result of a forty-year
strategy that has seen us develop substantial pools of labour with
the skills demanded by these specialised industries. The
availability of this skilled workforce is likely to be a key factor
that will help Ireland to continue attracting FDI projects. In
contrast, despite relatively high levels of general education,
Eastern European countries are still only in the early stages of re-
orienting their education system to the needs of a market
economy.
The IT sector probably provides a good example of how high-
tech industries in Ireland may develop over time. To assess if EU
enlargement might shift IT production located in Ireland to
Eastern Europe we looked at five sub-segments of the IT sector:
computer assembly, electronic components, mass market
packaged software, R&D and other software production (mainly
business software). In this area, it appears as though jobs in
lower-skill sub-sectors such as computer assembly are going
elsewhere in Europe.
Looking at evolution of this sub-sector in more detail, during the
early to mid-1990s the bulk of computers sold in Europe were
assembled in either Ireland or Scotland. In addition, Ireland
accounted for over 40 per cent of all packaged software and 60
per cent of business software sold in Europe. However, computerQuarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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assembly operations in Ireland have experienced serious job-
losses and plant closures in Ireland since the late 1990s. In 1998,
five microcomputer makers and one contract manufacturer
employed nearly 10,000 workers out of a total of 16,000 in this
sector in Ireland. By 2002, only Dell and Apple continued as
assemblers, with Apple’s operations dramatically downsized (e.g.
Frank Barry, 2003).
In contrast, the production of electronic components such as
microchips is a more highly skilled activity and Ireland is
expected to have continued growth in this sector. It is likely that
MNEs undertaking R&D will continue to operate in a portfolio
of locations, including Ireland, to benefit from differing national
systems of innovation (such as Science Foundation Ireland).
Software localisation is another area in which Ireland has
specialised, and this appears likely to remain the case.
Paradoxically, the availability of higher wages for these jobs in
Ireland relative to the CEE region may help these industries to
expand their Irish operations, since they rely in part on attracting
foreign workers.
7. Conclusion
This paper has examined the potential implications for Irish
employment and foreign direct investment of the enlargement of
the EU to incorporate the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). Despite fears related to the incorporation of a
substantial pool of low-wage workers inside the EU, our study
found limited evidence for the substitution of jobs between
parent firms and their foreign affiliates.
Concerning job re-allocation by multinational enterprises, we
reported a set of results from a Bank study based on a large data
set of European-based parent firms and their affiliates. The study
found evidence that parent companies tended to reallocate jobs
among their affiliates in the high-wage regions of Europe so as to
minimise their costs. In contrast, limited evidence was found of
job substitution between parent firms and their affiliates located
in the lower-wage regions of Europe.
In terms of relating this conclusion to Irish-based multinational
affiliates, a caveat is that the data set for the Bank study featured
only a limited number of US-owned corporations. This is in
contrast to the composition of Irish affiliates, which are
approximately 50 per cent US-owned. It is possible that the
behaviour of US-owned firms could differ from the patterns
found in our study. That said, other recent studies that have
focused solely on US multinationals have come to similar
conclusions to those discussed here (see N. Gregory Mankiw
and Philip Swagel, 2005), specifically that there is limited
evidence of US multinationals substituting high-tech jobs fromQuarterly Bulletin 1 2006
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affiliates in high-wage countries to affiliates in very low-wage
countries.
Concerning the threat to future foreign direct investment in
Ireland posed by the enlargement of the EU, the evidence
reported here has shown that the sectoral composition of FDI is
very different to that of the FDI going to the CEE region. The
growth in Irish manufacturing FDI has primarily been focused in
the pharmaceutical, medical instrument and IT sectors. In
contrast, FDI into the CEE region has been concentrated in
activities such as oil and mineral extraction, assembly operations
(for example in the car, computer and white-good sectors), and
extensive chemical production. In addition, much of the foreign
direct investment going into Eastern Europe takes the form of
mergers or takeovers of existing enterprises, whereas the vast
majority of FDI projects in Ireland are of the ‘‘greenfield’’ variety.
To summarise, as of now, there seems to be little competition
between Ireland and the CEE region for foreign direct
investment projects.
This is not to say that there should be no concerns relating to our
ability to attract FDI in the future. While Ireland’s FDI-orientated
strategy has clearly brought significant benefits, it may carry
some risks for the future performance of the economy. Ireland
currently has a relatively narrow sectoral concentration of FDI in
a handful of ‘‘high-tech’’ sectors. Our economy has relied heavily
on investment flows from US multinational companies, which
have tended to be the international leaders in these sectors. For
these reasons, Ireland could be vulnerable to worldwide shocks
to our chosen sectors or to a general downturn in the US
economy that led to lower levels of outward foreign direct
investment.
Another potentially serious source of concern in relation to
Ireland’s FDI strategy is our ability to maintain cost
competitiveness. This is underlined by our finding that wage cost
considerations are an important factor leading multinational
enterprises to reallocate jobs among the higher-wage countries
in Europe. This suggests that, while the results of our research
are perhaps somewhat reassuring, they do not justify
complacency about the cost competitiveness of the Irish
economy relative to our international competitors.
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